continuing human rights violations such as extra-judicial killings and the murder of candidates of political parties and human rights activists. 4 If at least half of Cambodia's small arms are assumed under formal governmental authority, others lie in caches in mountainous regions and forests or are held by armed bandits and criminals. For example, in certain still insecure regions of Cambodia, gangs of up to 30 armed people have attacked travellers on national roads and police posts, killing civilians as well as members of the security forces. Such gangs often include former combatants, in particular those who previously fought with the Khmer Rouge. In the eastern Kratie Province, one notorious leader of such gangs, a former Khmer Rouge commander, is said to have personal stockpiles of small arms hidden in forests that were created under his command during the war. 5 In addition are those weapons held by civilians for self-protection, a perception of weapons possession as a source of power and pride, as well as purposes such as hunting to supplement meagre diets. In effect, small arms are also frequently used in disputes between neighbours over, for example, farmland and in domestic violence. Possession of and accessibility to small arms among civilians is varied and while in "some regions and cities most families probably do not have a gun" 6 , in many rural areas family members would seem to at least know of the whereabouts of one or more weapons that are hidden in surrounding farmland and forests. Differences in regional accessibility to weapons are closely related to the history of these regions during Cambodia's violent conflict and it is particular in former Khmer
Rouge strongholds that accessibility to weapons is highest.
Addressing the small arms situation in Cambodia is clearly a complex task. The Royal Government lacks human and financial resources, capacities and adequate mechanisms necessary for effective stockpile management and security as well as for the appropriate control of the conduct of members of the security forces. Moreover, while weapons collection programmes through house searches and the checking of cars can contribute to a reduction of small arms availability, civilians ultimately have to be convinced that handing over weapons they possess or know of is in their own interest. This is complicated by the fact that due to the "combination of poverty, crime and unemployment, coupled with a degree of political In short, small arms control should not be seen in isolation from other necessary reforms in the security and other sectors. Small arms control efforts can, by themselves, certainly already address and remedy major concerns related to small arms proliferations in post-conflict situations. Nevertheless, the misuse of weapons, for example, would seem rather a reflection of underlying state-society relations and societal structures than a phenomenon that can be fully controlled by existing control efforts. As held above, necessary reforms in this context themselves pose complex challenges. Crucial in this respect is whether Cambodia will overcome its deeply entrenched factionalism within its state institutions and their lack of accountability. Thus, there remain deep splits between the previously warring parties that now control state institutions and organs such as the administration, the security forces and the judiciary. For example, the primary loyalty of mid and high ranking officials in state institutions would seem to lie with the political group and powerful individuals therein on whose goodwill their position and advancement depends rather than on the ideal of a neutral and independent state machinery. In addition of course comes the fact that state employees, soldiers and policemen earn on average US$ 15-20 a month, a sum that evidently does not allow for covering more than the most essential needs of employees and their families. It is changes in such fundamental structures and relationships that would seem required for the creation of neutral, independent and professional state institutions and to the consolidation of the rule of law in Cambodia. And, as argued here, this in turn is a necessary condition for effectively ending the availability and misuse of small arms in the long term.
Conclusion
This report on small arms control in Cambodia has argued that current initiatives by the Royal Government, Cambodia's civil society and international donors are certainly contributing to a reduction of small arms availability and misuse. It also argued that the ultimate success of such efforts might depend on progress in reforms in several other sectors of the state and, fundamentally, on changes in governance practices. In other words, while current control efforts can make important contributions to the consolidation of security and stability in the short term, in the medium and long term small arms control efforts need to be supplemented by broader changes in Cambodia's state institutions and state-society relations.
What then are implications for the future of small arms control in Cambodia, and for the contribution by international donors? Changes is state-society relations and attitudes among high-ranking governmental and military officials certainly have to be driven by domestic interests. In this context, the emergence of a viable and critically engaged civil society will be a key towards such changes. It is beyond the capacity of international programmes to drive such changes as they can, at best, only contribute by supporting domestic actors in the articulation and implementation of their interests. This having been said, international donors should ensure that their support for small arms control is put on a sustainable basis. Thus, at present, it would seem just to say that there exists a funding bubble for local NGOs working on small arms control in Cambodia. A major concern for the future is that donors, turning their attention and resources to other issue-areas and countries, will withdraw their funding for small arms control and therewith end the ability of most Cambodian NGOs to continue their work in awareness raising and training of security personnel. Donors should therefore make conscious efforts to include concern for sustainability of small arms control in their programming. This, in turn, would make a considerable contribution to combating small arms proliferation in Cambodia in the medium and long term.
